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BIOTERRORISM, PUBLIC HEALTH, 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
HE prospect of having to deal with a bioter-
rorist attack, especially one involving smallpox,
has local, state, and federal officials rightly
concerned.1,2 Before September 11, most procedures
for dealing with a bioterrorist attack against the Unit-
ed States were based on fiction. Former President Bill
Clinton became engaged in the bioterrorism issue in
1997, after reading Richard Preston’s novel The Co-
bra Event.3 In Tom Clancy’s 1996 Executive Orders,4
the United States is attacked by terrorists using a
strain of Ebola virus that is transmissible through the
air. To contain the epidemic, the President declares a
state of emergency, orders that all nonessential busi-
nesses and places of public assembly be closed, and
suspends all interstate travel by airplane, train, bus,
and automobile. In defending the order, the fictional
President makes a statement that is now often used
to justify major changes in our criminal laws: “The
Constitution is not a suicide pact.”4
The anthrax attacks through the U.S. mail dem-
onstrated that the federal government must provide
better planning, coordination, and communication
with the public, as well as better drugs and vac-
cines.5,6 What remains more controversial is whether
we must give up any civil liberties to deal with this
“different kind of war.” What steps should the gov-
ernment take to prepare for a bioterrorist attack in-
volving the use of smallpox or another contagious
agent, and which level of government, state or fed-
eral, should take the lead?
BIOTERRORISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH
The prospect of a bioterrorist attack and the actu-
al attacks in Florida, the District of Columbia, New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut have changed
public health in the United States. Since the found-
ing of the country, public health has been consid-
ered primarily the business of the states. The reason
is that when the former colonies delegated powers to
the federal government in the U.S. Constitution, they
retained the authority to protect the public’s health
T
and safety, usually referred to as the state’s “police
powers.”7,8 The federal government may, nonethe-
less, affect public health and safety through its con-
stitutional authority to spend money, regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce, and provide for national
defense. The Congress established the Public Health
Service and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) with federal money and used its
authority under the commerce clause of the Consti-
tution to establish the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA). The creation of these federal agencies,
however, did not alter the states’ responsibility for
public health; the anthrax attacks did.
Bioterrorism — the deliberate release of a harmful
biologic agent to intimidate civilians and their gov-
ernment — constitutes a threat to public health that
differs from any other public health threat that our
country has faced. An act of bioterrorism is both a
state and a federal crime, and it can also be an act of
war.9 Because of our highly developed transportation
system, communicable diseases can be spread widely
in a short period of time. All these factors make it
reasonable to view bioterrorism as an inherently fed-
eral matter under both the national-defense and com-
merce clauses of the Constitution. Thus, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CDC took
the lead in investigating all the anthrax mail attacks.
Moreover, had the attacks originated outside the
country, the U.S. military and the Central Intelligence
Agency would have been called on to respond.
BUILDING A MODERN 
PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11
attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks through
the U.S. mail, hospitals, cities, states, and federal of-
ficials began developing or revisiting protocols to
deal with possible biologic attacks in the future. The
federal response has so far emphasized the stockpil-
ing of drugs and vaccines that could be used to re-
spond to an attack, especially one involving small-
pox.10 Other proposals have included improving the
public health infrastructure of the country (especial-
ly the ability to monitor diagnoses made in emergen-
cy departments and pharmacy sales of relevant drugs)
and training emergency medical personnel to recog-
nize and treat the diseases most likely to be caused by
a bioterrorist attack (such as anthrax, smallpox, and
plague).11 Major efforts are also under way to improve
coordination and communication among local, state,
and federal officials who are responsible for respond-
ing to emergencies and to delineate more clearly the
lines of authority involving “homeland security.” All
these measures are reasonable and responsible steps
our government should take.
Properly worried that many state public health
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laws are outdated and perhaps inadequate to permit
state officials to contain an epidemic caused by a
bioterrorist attack, the CDC has advised all states to
review the adequacy of their laws, with special atten-
tion to provisions for quarantining people in the
event of a smallpox attack.12 In addition, the CDC
released a proposed model act for the states, the
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, on Oc-
tober 23, 2001.12,13 The act was constructed by the
Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown
University and Johns Hopkins University and was
pieced together from a variety of existing state laws.
THE ORIGINAL MODEL STATE 
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
The original model act permits the governor to
declare a “state of public health emergency,” and
this declaration, in turn, gives state public health of-
ficials the authority to take over all health care facili-
ties in the state, order physicians to act in certain
ways, and order citizens to submit to examinations
and treatment, with those who refuse to do so subject
to quarantine or criminal punishment. The model act
specifies that public health officials and those work-
ing under their authority are immune from liability
for their actions, including actions that cause perma-
nent injury or death; the only exceptions are in cases
of gross negligence and willful misconduct. A public
health emergency (the condition that requires the
governor to declare a state of public health emergen-
cy) is defined as “an occurrence or imminent threat
of an illness or health condition, caused by bioterror-
ism, epidemic or pandemic disease, or [a] novel and
highly fatal infectious agent or biological toxin, that
poses a substantial risk of a significant number of hu-
man fatalities or incidents of permanent or long-term
disability.”13
The declaration of a state of public health emer-
gency permits the governor to suspend state regula-
tions, change the functions of state agencies, and
mobilize the militia. Under the model act, all public
health personnel will be issued special identification
badges, to be worn “in plain view,” that “shall indi-
cate the authority of the bearer to exercise public
health functions and emergency powers. . . .”13 Pub-
lic health personnel may “compel a health care facil-
ity to provide services or the use of its facility if such
services or use are reasonable and necessary for emer-
gency response . . . [including] transferring the
management and supervision of the health care fa-
cility to the public health authority.”
According to the act’s provisions, public health
personnel have exceptionally broad powers, and fail-
ure of physicians and citizens to follow their orders
is a crime. Section 502 of the act, which covers man-
datory medical examinations and testing, states:
Any person refusing to submit to the medical examination
and/or testing is liable for a misdemeanor. If the public
health authority is uncertain whether a person who refuses
to undergo medical examination and/or testing may have
been exposed to an infectious disease or otherwise poses
a danger to public health, the public health authority may
subject the individual to isolation or quarantine. . . . Any
[health care provider] refusing to perform a medical exam-
ination or test as authorized herein shall be liable for a
misdemeanor. . . . An order of the public health author-
ity given to effectuate the purposes of this subsection shall
be immediately enforceable by any peace officer.13
Section 504, on vaccination and treatment, states,
“Individuals refusing to be vaccinated or treated
shall be liable for a misdemeanor. If, by reason of re-
fusal of vaccination or treatment, the person poses a
danger to the public health, he or she may be sub-
ject to isolation or quarantine. . . . An order of the
public health authority given to effectuate the pur-
poses of this Section shall be immediately enforce-
able by any peace officer.”13
THE NEED FOR NEW STATE LAWS
ON BIOTERRORISM
Of course, state public health, police, fire, and
emergency planners should be clear about their au-
thority, and to the extent that it encourages states to
review their emergency laws, the model act is con-
structive. On the other hand, many of the provisions
of this act, especially those giving public health offi-
cials authority over physicians and hospitals, as well
as authority to enforce a quarantine in the absence
of meaningful standards, seem to be based on the
assumption that neither physicians nor citizens are
likely to cooperate with public health officials in the
event of a bioterrorist attack. This assumption, in turn,
seems to be based on the results of theoretical plan-
ning exercises involving simulated bioterrorist at-
tacks, including the Top Officials 2000 (Top Off )
and Dark Winter exercises.12 Top Off was an exercise
that simulated a bioterrorist attack on Denver that
involved the use of aerosolized Yersinia pestis, the
bacteria that causes plague.14 Dark Winter simulated
a smallpox attack on Oklahoma City.15 Using these
simulated cases as a basis for legislation is unreason-
able, given the extremely high level of voluntary co-
operation on the part of the public, physicians, and
hospitals after both the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks.
In my opinion, the model act poses several prob-
lems. First, proposed laws should respond to real prob-
lems. It is not at all clear what problem the model
act is intended to solve, and this makes it extremely
difficult to evaluate. 
Second, the authority to respond to a bioterrorist
attack or a new epidemic that the model act provides
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is much too broad, since it applies not just to real
emergencies such as a smallpox attack but also to
nonemergency conditions as diverse as annual influ-
enza epidemics and the AIDS epidemic.16,17 
Third, although it may make sense to put public
health officials in charge of responding to a smallpox
attack, it may not make sense to put them in charge
of responding to every type of bioterrorist event. In
the event of a bioterrorist attack, the state public
health department has a major role in limiting the
public’s exposure to the agent. However, the tasks of
identifying affected persons, reporting them, treating
them, and taking preventive actions will be performed
by physicians, nurses, emergency medical personnel,
and hospitals. The primary role of public health au-
thorities will usually be, as it was in the wake of the
anthrax attacks, to provide guidance to the public
and other government officials in identifying and
dealing with the disease and to provide laboratory
facilities where exposure can be evaluated and diag-
noses definitively established.5,6,18
Fourth, there is no evidence from either the Sep-
tember 11 attacks or the anthrax attacks that physi-
cians, nurses, or members of the public are reluctant
to cooperate in the response to a bioterrorist attack
or are reluctant to take drugs or vaccines recom-
mended by public health or medical officials. In fact,
medical personnel in the affected areas volunteered
their time and expertise to help victims of the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, and the public lined up to be test-
ed for anthrax and stockpiled ciprofloxacin.19 The
public demand for testing and treatment was so
great that the CDC had to issue recommendations
against both. 
Of course, anthrax, unlike smallpox, is not spread
from person to person. The situation might have
been different if smallpox had been used as a biolog-
ic weapon or if thousands or tens of thousands of
people had been infected with anthrax. Nonetheless,
there is no empirical evidence that draconian provi-
sions for quarantine, such as those outlined in the
model act, are necessary or desirable. Persons with
smallpox, for example, are most infectious only after
fever and a rash have developed,12 and then they are
usually so sick that they are likely to accept whatever
care is available. Moreover, according to Barbera et
al., the “long incubation period (10–17 days) almost
ensures that some persons who are infected in the
[smallpox] attack will have traveled great distances
from the site of the exposure before the disease is rec-
ognized or quarantine could be implemented.”14 The
key to an effective public health response is identify-
ing and helping those who have been exposed. Even
with a sufficient supply of smallpox vaccine, a quaran-
tine enforced by the police would probably not be ef-
fective in controlling an outbreak of smallpox.12,14,20
This is a major reason for the current recommenda-
tion that smallpox vaccine be made available to the
public on a voluntary basis.21
Finally, even if it is concluded that a quarantine
law may be useful to respond to a bioterrorist attack
(e.g., as a means of ensuring that the few unwilling
Americans, if any, would be treated, vaccinated, or
quarantined), it should be a federal law, not a state
law. The reason is that bioterrorism is a matter of na-
tional security, not just of state police powers. The
existing federal quarantine law is based on the com-
merce clause of the Constitution (with special pro-
visions for cholera, plague, smallpox, typhus, and
yellow fever), and Congress could examine and up-
date it to deal with bioterrorism.22,23 The governors
of the states involved in the anthrax attacks all real-
ized that bioterrorism is fundamentally a federal is-
sue and quickly called for action from both the FBI
and the CDC to deal with the attacks.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCIES
The model act is based on the belief that in public
health emergencies, there must be a trade-off be-
tween the protection of civil rights and effective
public health interventions. There is, of course, prec-
edent for this belief, and the preamble to the model
act cites the 1905 case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts in
stating the proposition that “the whole people cov-
enants with each citizen, and each citizen with the
whole people, that all shall be governed by certain
laws for the ‘common good.’”8,13 Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts involved a state statute that permitted local
boards of health to require vaccination when they
deemed it “necessary for the public health or safety.”
There were no provisions for quarantine in the stat-
ute, and refusal to be vaccinated was punishable by a
$5 fine. Refusal was anticipated in the early 1900s be-
cause vaccination itself was controversial, there were
no antibiotics, physicians were not widely trusted,
science and medicine were in their infancy, and hos-
pitals were primarily “pesthouses.”24 Trade-offs be-
tween civil liberties (the right to refuse treatment)
and public health interventions (mandatory vaccina-
tion) seemed necessary in such circumstances.25
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court
cited the military draft as the precedent for uphold-
ing the Massachusetts law. The point is not that the
Constitution does not give the government wide lat-
itude to respond in times of war and public health
emergencies — it does. The point is that trade-offs
between civil rights and public health measures are
not always required and can be counterproductive.
Just as we have been able to abolish the draft and
rely on all-volunteer armed forces, so it seems rea-
sonable to think that we can rely on Americans to
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follow the reasonable instructions of government of-
ficials for their own protection.
Today, almost 100 years after Jacobson, both med-
icine and constitutional law are radically different.7
We now take constitutional rights much more seri-
ously, including the right of a competent adult to
refuse any medical treatment, even life-saving treat-
ment.26 Of course, we would still permit public
health officials to quarantine persons with a serious
communicable disease, such as infectious tuberculo-
sis, but only if they could not or would not accept
treatment and thus put others at risk for exposure.27
Even then, however, we would require public offi-
cials to use the “least restrictive alternative” and re-
sort to quarantine only after other interventions,
such as directly observed therapy, had failed.27 Pro-
visions for quarantine are also accompanied by due-
process rights, including the right to legal represen-
tation and the right to a hearing.27
The model act seems to have been drafted for a dif-
ferent age; it is more appropriate for the United States
of the 19th century than for the United States of the
21st century. Today, all adults have the constitutional
right to refuse examination and treatment, and such
a refusal should not result in involuntary confinement
simply on the whim of a public health official. At the
very least, persons suspected of having a contagious
disease should have the option of being examined by
physicians of their own choice and, if isolation is nec-
essary, of being isolated in their own homes.27 The re-
quirement that physicians treat patients against their
will and against the physicians’ medical judgment
under penalty of criminal law has no precedent and
makes no sense. Moreover, state governors already
have broad emergency powers; there is no compelling
reason to expand them.
Just as important as the constitutional questions
posed by the model act is the pragmatic question of
whether it is likely to undermine the public’s trust in
public health — trust that is absolutely essential for
containing panic in a bioterrorist-induced epidemic.
Unlike the situation at the turn of the last century,
for example, we have televised news 24 hours a day,
cell phones, and automobiles, making a large-scale
quarantine impossible unless the public believes that
it is absolutely necessary to prevent the spread of fa-
tal disease and is fairly and safely administered. En-
actment of a law that made it a crime to disobey a
public health officer would rightly engender dis-
trust, because it would suggest that public officials
could not provide valid reasons for their actions.
The necessity of maintaining the public’s trust
also means that the argument that, in a public health
emergency, there must be a trade-off between effec-
tive public health measures and civil rights is simply
wrong. As the AIDS epidemic has demonstrated, the
promotion of human rights can be essential for deal-
ing effectively with an epidemic.28 Early in the course
of the AIDS epidemic, public health officials recog-
nized that mandatory screening for human immu-
nodeficiency virus would simply help drive the epi-
demic underground, where it would spread faster and
wider. Likewise, draconian quarantine measures would
probably have the unintended effect of encouraging
people to avoid public health officials and physicians
rather than to seek them out. In this regard, the pro-
tection of civil liberties is a core ingredient in a suc-
cessful response to a bioterrorist attack. Provisions
that treat citizens as the enemy, with the use of the
police for enforcement, are much more likely to cost
lives than to save them. This is one reason why there
has not been a large-scale quarantine in the United
States for more than 80 years and why experts on
bioterrorism doubt that such a quarantine would be
effective.14,20
THE REVISED MODEL ACT
On December 21, 2001, in response to criticisms
of the model act, including those I have summa-
rized, a revised version was released.29 No one any
longer considers the act a “model.” Instead, it is
now labeled a “draft for discussion.” The new ver-
sion does “not represent the official policy, endorse-
ment, or views” of anyone, including the authors
themselves and the CDC.29
Although the revised act can be viewed as a mod-
est improvement, all the fundamental problems re-
main. Failure to comply with the orders of public
health officials for examination or treatment is no
longer a crime but results in isolation or quarantine.
Criminal penalties continue to apply to failure to
follow isolation or quarantine “rules” that will be
written at a future time. Physicians and other health
care providers can still be required “to assist” public
health officials, but cooperation is now coerced as “a
condition of licensure” instead of a legal requirement
with criminal penalties for noncompliance. The quar-
antine provisions have been improved, with a new re-
quirement that quarantine or isolation be imposed by
“the least restrictive means necessary” and stronger
due-process protection, including hearings and legal
representation for those actually quarantined.29 None-
theless, on the basis of a written directive by a public
health official, a person can still be quarantined for 15
days before a hearing must be held, and the hearing
itself can be for groups of quarantined persons rather
than individuals.29
Some of the revised quarantine provisions seem
even more arbitrary. A major criticism of the origi-
nal version of the act was the extreme vagueness of
its standard for quarantine, which invited the arbi-
trary use of force. According to the original version,
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quarantine can be ordered if a public health official
is “uncertain whether a person who refuses to un-
dergo medical examination or testing may have been
exposed to an infectious disease or otherwise poses
a danger to public health.” In the revised version,
the standard is even vaguer. Quarantine can be or-
dered when the person’s refusal to be examined or
tested “results in uncertainty regarding whether he
or she has been exposed to or is infected with a con-
tagious or possibly contagious disease or otherwise
poses a danger to public health.”29 This is no stand-
ard at all; it simply permits public health authorities
to quarantine anyone who refuses to be examined or
treated, for whatever reason, since all refusals will re-
sult in uncertainty. If one were already certain, one
would not order the test. At the hearing, if request-
ed, the standard for a continued quarantine appears
to be the finding that the person would “significant-
ly jeopardize the public health authority’s ability to
prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious or
possibly contagious disease to others.” This standard
also makes no sense because the public health focus,
I think, should be on the person’s condition and on
the determination of whether it poses a danger to
others, not on the public health authority’s ability to
function.
These vague standards are especially troublesome
because the act’s incredible immunity provision re-
mains unchanged. Thus, all state public health offi-
cials and all private companies and persons operating
under their authority are granted immunity from li-
ability for their actions (except for gross negligence
or willful misconduct), even in the case of death or
permanent injury. Out-of-state emergency health care
providers have even greater protection; they are giv-
en immunity from liability for everything but man-
slaughter. In my opinion, such immunity is some-
thing public health authorities should not want (even
though it may have superficial appeal), because it
means that they are not accountable for their actions,
no matter how arbitrary. The immunity provision
thus serves only to undermine the public’s trust in
public health authorities. Citizens should never be
treated against their will by their government, but if
they ever are, they should be fully compensated for
injuries suffered as a result.
CONCLUSIONS
All sorts of proposals were floated in the wake of
the September 11 attacks — some potentially useful,
such as irradiation of mail at the facilities that had
been targeted, and some potentially dangerous, such
as the use of secret military tribunals and measures
that would erode lawyer–client confidentiality, un-
dermine our constitutional values, and make us less
able to criticize authoritarian countries for similar
behavior. I think the Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act is one of the dangerous proposals.
Bioterrorism is primarily a federal, not a state, is-
sue, and actions undertaken to prevent and respond
to bioterrorism should be a federal priority.30 Laws
that provide funding for training in the recognition
and treatment of diseases caused by pathogens that
could be used as biologic weapons deserve support, as
do laws that improve communication and coordina-
tion in response to such an attack. The Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention also deserves our sup-
port.31 In my opinion, laws that treat Americans and
their physicians as the enemy and grant broad, arbi-
trary powers to public health officials without making
them accountable do not deserve support and distract
us from important work that needs to be done. The
fear and frenzy that prompted state legislatures to con-
sider new antiterrorist laws after September 11 seem
to have abated, and reason may yet prevail over pan-
ic.32 Of course the Constitution is not a suicide pact,
but we do not have to sacrifice civil liberties for an ef-
fective public health response to a bioterrorist attack.
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